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THE CHINA
syndrome
Beijing likes to portray itself as the last bastion of 
Communism, Annette Chan isn't convinced. She finds 
the Communist elite adapting remarkably effortlessly to 
the brave new world of China's market experiment.
n the socialist and post-socialist 
economies alike, profound social ten­
sions threaten to stymie the economic 
reform processes that have been set in 
motion. In the Eastern European countries which 
have already adopted a democratic political sys­
tem, it is now all too clear that even after the 
overthrow of the communist parties, it is not easy 
to transform the economy into a capitalist one.
Some of the former East European dissidents—the likes of 
Vaclav Havel—have articulated concern regarding the 
plight of ordinary people during the difficult transition to 
the new economic order. But such concerns have been 
near-absent in China. Here 1 am not thinking of Deng 
Xiaoping and the political hardliners, but rather the in­
creasingly influential intellectual elite and, in particular, 
the branch of tile political elite that has been most fervently 
in favour of economic and political reforms. A large num­
ber of well-known intellectuals have, in the past, served in
the think-tanks of the now-ousted Communist Party 
secretary Zhao Ziyang, the champion of economic reforms. 
In their reform program there is little mention of the human 
costs to be incurred. Concern about unemployment and 
widening inequality are dismissed out of hand as a throw­
back to die "eating from a big pot" syndrome of maoism.
It was under this new program of economic development 
through greater reliance on market forces, spurred on by 
the official slogan of "allow a few people to get rich first”, 
that China reformed its economic system in the 1980s. The 
initial successes of the economic reforms invoked the envy 
of the East Europeans and the Soviet Union. China's 
private capitalist sector was then the most sizeable of all 
the socialist states.
However, over the last decade, this hybrid planned/free 
market economy has become a mechanism by which the 
Chinese nomenklatura has been able to enrich itself. Offi­
cials could take advantage of a government-sponsored 
double-track pricing system, using their power and con­
nections to resell, privately and at a high market price, the
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centrally-allocated goods they had bought at a low state- 
controlled price. Or else the party secretaries and directors 
of enterprises could step forward as candidates to lease out 
their own enterprise, guaranteeing that a fixed amount of 
revenue would be turned over to the state as rent each year. 
They could then lay off workers and reduce wages, cutting 
the salary budget in the name of efficiency, meanwhile 
granting themselves high salaries and bonuses. So lucra­
tive has this leasing-management' practice become that it
has aroused a heated debate in the press as to whether it 
constitutes 'capitalism' and whether a new class of 
'capitalists without capital' is in the making.
But the most lucrative exercise of all is to get into the 
import-export trade, a line of business which is largely 
monopolised by the dose kin of national leaders. Much of 
this economic activity involves establishing 'trading 
companies' in the various provinces of China, or in the
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special economic zones like Zhenzhen, or in Hong Kong. 
The rakeoffs are massive. In many respects these export- 
import middlemen, whose only assets are high family con­
nections, can be called 'socialist compradors', the 
equivalents of the pre-1949 businessmen who were labelled 
as hated "enemies of the people" when the communist 
government first took power.
In short, while the political structure and the command 
economy are still under the control of a one-party system, 
the Chinese economic reforms have within ten years ef­
fected the rise of a new monied class—a class largely bom 
within the households of die party nomenklatura. The 
remainder of this new monied class, to be sure, are 
entrepreneurs who have risen by their own efforts, all the 
while paying off the nomenklatura for the privilege. These 
two groups of different origins within the new monied elite 
are beginning to intermingle, and are intermarrying. That 
is to say, while monopolising political power, and not even 
aiming for a complete dismantling of the command 
economy, the Chinese nomenklatura is well down the path 
of transforming itself into partof a new dominant economic 
class.
Whichever direction China heads in over the next couple 
of decades, be it as a one-party state operating a hybrid 
command-market economy, or a multiparty system with a 
free-market economy, the nomenklatura and its progeny 
and in-laws look likely to end up controlling a lion's share 
of the wealth.
bureaucracy to implement the reforms, the reform leader­
ship refrained from cracking down on the corruption and 
the shady 'grey areas' of nomenklatura self-enrichment If 
there was to oe a new monied elite, after all, why should it 
not be this group as against, arbitrarily, some other?
By comparison, the urban workers deemed themselves to 
be the losers in the new order, as the protests of 1989 amply 
showed. While the workers had accepted in principle that 
economic reforms of some sort were needed, they were not 
ready to accept growing lay-offs of blue-collar employees 
in the name of industrial efficiency. Worse still, workers 
were being told to tighten their own belts at the very same 
time that they could see the nomenklatura fattening them­
selves. The nostalgia expressed by some workers during 
the Tiananmen protests for the maoist era—an era of near­
equal poverty for all and of low-productivi ty job security— 
reflects the fact that many have not seen the reforms as 
benefiting themselves sufficiently to offset the loss in their 
social standing and security of employment.
If die 1989 mass protest movement was an inchoate initia­
tive to block the formation of a new political-economic 
class, one that they could see had been taking toot under 
the tutelage of the monolithic party-state, the apprehen­
sions of the democratic mo vement have not abated over the 
past two years. The private sector of the economy is again 
expanding rapidly. In terms of who is able to rise, the 
playing field is still not level, and thus the resentments 
remain.
In the mass protests of 1989, the democratic movement 
demanded an end to "bureaucratic corruption'' and "offi­
cial profiteering". These demands implied that if the party 
had the will to reform itself and combat its members' 
"corruption", the health of Chinese politics and economy 
could be restored. After the Beijing massacre, in response 
to the grievances that had been expressed in the streets, the 
top party leadership trumpeted a major anti-corruption 
campaign. This proved ineffectual. The underlying reason 
is that the "corruption" is not a by-product but rather an 
integral part of the economic reforms. "Bureaucratic cor­
ruption" and "official profiteering" are part and parcel of 
the gestation process of a new elite class. Though the par­
ticipants in the 1989 mass protest movement did not always 
see things this way, their fulminations against "corruption" 
could be seen in effect as a concerted outcry against the rise 
of this new class.
Some Western and Chinese observers have argued that this 
was the source of the popular protests. Yet the economic 
reforms of the 1980s had, if anything, been proceeding at a 
helter-skelter pace. More often than not, laws were promul­
gated only after Communist Party reform edicts had al­
ready instituted substantial economic and social change. 
Policies were carried out without any adequate legal 
provisions or institutional framework to prevent the rise of 
blatant corruption. Instead, the economic restructuring was 
made possible because the party nomenklatura found the 
restructuring within its own interests; they did not resist it 
precisely because it enabled them to be the beneficiaries of 
a less economically fair society. And the top party leader­
ship was dearly aware of this. In order to persuade the
Since 1989, the party leadership has been desperately 
trying to woo the workers back into the fold by appealing 
to their "proletarian consciousness". Despite the chronic 
problem of over-staffing in the workplace, great efforts 
have been made to rehire dismissed or partially laid-off 
workers. The new twist in enterprise reform, at least 
rhetorically, now includes workers' rights to participate in 
management. Staff-and-workers' councils are to be 
strengthened; and trade unions are to represent the 
workers' interests instead of serving openly as an arm of 
the administration. There are signs that the trade unions 
are, in fact, taking advantage of these new slogans to 
wrestle greater independence and power for themselves.
But without radical institutional reforms, the chances of 
success in placating the workers and in raising their work 
incentive remains poor. Workers' productivity in the state 
enterprises continues to decline. The clarion call to "save 
socialism" is raised in the name of "class interest", but it is 
too palpably devoid of content. Whereas Chinese reformers 
put a premium on economic development at the expense 
of heavy sodal costs, the Chinese hardliners put a premium 
on protecting their power and maintaining stability by 
half-heartedly asserting that they wish to mitigate the so­
dal costs involved—all the while doing little to stop the 
nomenklatura from transforming itself into a monied elite. 
In this regard the top Chinese leadership has dearly 
learned no lesson from the 1989 upheavals.
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